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THE RATIONALE FOR THE ABA RECOMMENDATIONS
Grant B. Cooper*
At the outset, I wish to emphasize that my purpose is neither to debate
with anyone the question of fair trial v. free press, nor to attempt to impose the
ideas of the bench and bar upon anyone. Rather, it is my purpose to discuss
the thinking behind the ABA Committee proposals.'
In doing this, I find myself in the position of the little boy in a small Mid-
western town whose parents kept a barrel of molasses in the basement. Each
day the little boy would sneak down to the basement, stick his fingers in the
barrel of molasses, and lick each one of them carefully, savoring the sweet taste
of the molasses. As time went by, the level of the molasses lowered near the
bottom of the barrel. Of course, the inevitable happened: leaning over to reach
the molasses, the little boy fell in. Standing up in the barrel with molasses
dripping from his head to his toes and licking the molasses from his fingers, the
youngster rolled his eyes heavenward and said, "Oh Lord, make my tongue
equal to this opportunity." So today, I hope that my tongue will be equal to
this opportunity.
The report of our Committee owes its origin in part to the Warren Com-
mission Report,2 which, after a full study and review of the events surrounding
the apprehension and death of Lee Harvey Oswald, concluded:
The experience in Dallas during November 22-24, is a dramatic affirmation
of the need for steps to bring about a proper balance between the right of
the public to be kept informed and the right of the individual to a fair
and impartial trial.3
The Committee's studies and recommendations received substantial impetus,
* Attorney at Law, Los Angeles, California; Member, ABA Advisory Committee on
Fair Trial and Free Press; Former President, American College of Trial Lawyers.
1 ABA, ADVIsoRY Comm. RBPORT ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Tent. Draft 1966) [hereinafter cited as ABA REP.].
2 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT
KENNEDY (1964).
3 Id. at 242.
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authority, and direction from the United States Supreme Court opinion in
Sheppard v. Maxwell.' In reversing the conviction primarily on the ground that
prejudicial publicity had interfered with Sheppard's right to fair trial,5 Mr.
Justice Clark, one of the more conservative members of the Court, placed the
primary blame and responsibility squarely where it belonged - on the shoulders
of the trial judge. In its opinion, the Court clearly and emphatically marked
the path that our Committee was bound to follow:
[W]e must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The
courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processes from prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel
for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers com-
ing under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function." (Emphasis added.)
It is worthy of note that the Court did not lay down any guidelines, direc-
tives, or admonitions for the communications media. Its mandate was to the
bench and bar of this country, and to those officers and employees whose con-
duct the courts have the power to control.
The recommendations of our Committee, all relating to criminal cases,
are divided into four parts: the first concerns the conduct of attorneys; the
second deals with the conduct of law enforcement officers and judicial employees;
the third is directed toward the conduct of judicial proceedings, the trial; and
the fourth focuses on the exercise of the contempt power. Limitations of space
do not permit a detailed analysis of each recommendation. Accordingly this
article addresses itself to the philosophy underlying these proposals.
The Committee had to answer the basic question: should we, members
of the legal profession, place our own house in order, or should we attempt,
within the framework of the constitutional limitations of freedom of speech and
press, to place restrictions on the communications media? A consensus eventually
crystallized, and we decided to adopt the philosophy of putting our own house
in order, thus rejecting the philosophy of attempting to dictate to another honor-
able profession the management of their own affairs. In adopting this view, we
were urged on by the editorial comment of the media that the bench and bar
should clean its own house before criticizing the practices of the communications
media. For example, Clifton Daniel, Managing Editor of the New York Times,
in a 1965 address before the Federal Bar Association in New York, stated that
while the press might feel constrained to point out the evils inherent in restricting
the free flow of information to the public, "the press in general will interpose
no objections to anything the bar, the bench and the police may do in the way
of disciplining their own people .... "'
Donald H. McGannon, President of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Com-
pany, expressed the view of that industry in a discussion on the subject of fair
4 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
5 Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
6 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
7 Daniel, Pre-trial Publicity, Nieman Reports, Sept. 1965, p. 2.
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trial and free press, in Santa Barbara in 1965.2 He urged attorneys to adhere
strictly to their own canons of ethics and called upon police authorities to follow
sound rules of procedure in detaining one accused of a crime. Mr. McGannon
quoted, approvingly, the following words of Edward Bennett Williams of Wash-
ington, D.C.:
If lawyers would meticulously abide by [Canon Twenty] most of the
difficulties would be overcome. Prosecutors would, of course, have to apply
a tight rein on the information which the police gave to the press. They
would have to see to it that such highly inflammatory materials as confes-
sions, past police records and statements of witnesses were not released to
reporters. Defense lawyers would likewise have to refrain from putting
out exculpatory materials and previews of the defense. Only the courts
and the appropriate disciplinary committees of the bar can enforce compli-
ance with this rule. But if compliance were rigidly enforced, it would go a
long way toward the elimination of "trial by newspaper."9
A former member of the Associated Press Managing Editors Association,
Alfred Friendly, although expressing some concern over the possibility that the
bench and bar would forge the shackles too tightly, nevertheless suggested:
If most of the trouble comes from the police or the courts in disclosing
information to the press, the press says, well, start there and we will play
our part at the same time. But don't start at the other end, and apply the
shackles to us first. Enforce Canon Twenty. Go ahead, as Dean Griswold
of the Harvard Law School has proposed, and amend Canon Five to
make the language of Canon Twenty more specific about disclosures.10
In the San Diego Union the press posed the challenge in these words:
U. S. newspaper editors yesterday were urged in a speech here "not
to yield one inch" in their fight against continued pressures against press
freedom, particularly in the reporting of criminal trials.
"We leave it to the lawyers to determine their own ethical standards,"
said William B. Dickinson, managing editor of the Philadelphia Bulletin,
"and we must determine our own."'1
Prompted by such editorial comment and the oral admonitions by some
of the leaders of the communications media, and recognizing the deficiencies in
the legal profession, we have proposed amendments to our own canons of ethics
to indicate specifically what information concerning a criminal case a lawyer
may ethically disclose. In the past, our canons were far too general. They
were simply ethical exhortations by which we hoped the legal profession would
abide. They were unenforceable, because no penalties were prescribed. As
suggested by the press, our proposed amendments now provide for discipline
by the bench and bar for violations of specific rules. However, the members
of the press now seem to feel we have forged the shackles too tightly. Specifically,
8 FAro TJ uA VS. A FRnE PR.ss 27-30 (Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
1965).
9 Id. at 29-30.
10 Id. at 22.
11 San Diego Union, Nov. 17, 1966.
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we stand accused of drying up their sources of information - in short, of
muzzling the press.12 This accusation deserves critical analysis.
As a predicate for this analysis, it is essential that the law's concept of a fair
trial be understood. To implement the constitutional guarantees of the right
to a fair trial, we employ the rules of evidence, which, based upon centuries of
experience, are designed to develop truth and eliminate extraneous issues. Thus,
hearsay is not permitted, nor may a defendant's character or reputation be
impeached or challenged when he does not take the witness stand. Records of
previous arrests and misdemeanor convictions are inadmissible in evidence.
Opinion evidence, save by properly qualified experts, may not be received. A
confession is not admissible until an affirmative showing is made that it was
freely and voluntarily given after the accused was advised of his right to remain
silent and his right to be represented by counsel. 3 Nor may other evidence
obtained in violation of constitutional rights be considered by the jury.' At
every recess courts admonish jurors not to form any opinion or discuss the case
among themselves or with any other person until the case is finally submitted
to them. Both court and counsel are ethically bound to refrain from expressing
personal opinions about the guilt or innocence of the accused. In most, if not
all jurisdictions, a defendant may not be brought into the courtroom in hand-
cuffs or prison garb. These are but a few of the safeguards designed to reinforce
the presumption of innocence accorded a criminal defendent. This is but a part
of the protection the law in its wisdom has provided to insure a defendant's
right to a fair trial, to prevent, as it were, sand from reaching the gears of our
legal machinery. When sand, in the nature of the dissemination of improper
and prejudicial statements to the press by lawyers, the police, and other similar
officials, is thrown into the judicial machinery, the only remedies at hand today
are: the changing of venue, which is no longer efficacious; the granting of con-
tinuances, mistrials, or new trials; or the reversing of convictions on appeal.
We believe the goal of the law and society should be to convict the guilty
fairly, within the law, and according to the rules, to insure the finality of con-
victions. We believe that the cost of continuances and retrials, with the con-
comitant risk of delay and acquittal, is too high a price to pay.
In 1964, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Van Duyne,3 while
affirming a conviction, nevertheless observed:
Such reversals cast a heavy burden, financial and otherwise, on the public
and the defendant. For example, in this case, even though improper pub-
licity has not resulted in a new trial, it imposed a substantial and otherwise
unnecessary expense on the taxpayers... of Passaic.... Impaneling of the
jury took three weeks. Sequestration began on the second day of trial and
after only one juror had been sworn. The cost to the public of maintaining
the jurors during that long period before a single bit of evidence could be
12 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 1966, § 4, p. 12, col. 1; id. Oct. 9, 1966, p. 89, col. 2.
See also id., Dec. 4, 1966, p. 79, col. 3.
13 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Rothblatt & Pitler, Police Interrogation:
Warnings and Waiver- Where Do We Go From Here? 42 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 479
(1967).
14 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15 43 N.J. 369, 204 A.2d 841 (1964).
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offered in support of the indictment was wholly unnecessary but for the
newspaper articles.'
We recognize that in that case and others, some lawyer, court attache, or police-
man was undoubtedly responsible for the release of the prejudicial information.
Although comparisons are odious, let us assume the converse situation.
Suppose some lawyer threw sand in the machinery that prints newspapers.
Would it be any answer to suggest that it would only cause some delay, and
after making repairs at substantial expense, newspapers could again be printed?
The bench and bar of this country are zealous in their conviction that an inde-
pendent press is essential to the preservation of our liberties. Likewise, they are
convinced that their own independence is essential to the preservation of our
liberties. The legal profession maintains that the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech and press also guarantees the correlative right to remain silent.
In proposing that we as lawyers restrict the dissemination of particular utterances,
we are merely exercising this right and duty to remain silent on matters that
interfere with a defendant's right to a fair trial. We had hoped that the com-
munications media would not want to deny us that right, even though in some
respects it might make their task of gathering news and keeping the public in-
formed more difficult. If the press had read and thoughtfully considered our
entire report, they would have been aware that we have not interfered with their
untrammeled right of freedom of speech, or their undenied right of freedom of
the press.
We have not told them what they may or may not do. This is left to their
sound discretion. Before a defendant is apprehended, they are at liberty to
obtain and release any information necessary to aid in his apprehension or to
warn the public of any danger he may present. At all times they may publish
any information obtainable from public records, and are likewise free to criticize
the bench, bar, and public officials. They are not circumscribed in their duty
to expose corruption, nor restricted in their right to editorialize, caricature, or
express their opinions. Nothing in our proposals interferes with the rights guar-
anteed to press, radio, or television under the Constitution.
It is true that we have recommended that courts adopt a rule concerning
preliminary pretrial matters. Under the rule all or a part of some hearings may
be held in chambers or the public, including the press, may be excluded from
the courtroom under certain circumstances. 7 Similarly, during the trial a court
may, at the defendant's request, hear certain matters in chambers or exclude
the public from the courtroom, provided the trial judge is of the opinion that
the dissemination of specific prejudicial information might jeopardize the right
to a fair trial by an impartial jury.'8
16 Id. at 387-88, 204 A.2d at 851.
17 ABA REP. 8.
18 The courts have always possessed the power to hold limited closed hearings. The
exercise of this power does not constitute an interference with either freedom of speech or
freedom of press. For example, CAL. PEN. ConE § 868 provides that in preliminary hearings
the courtroom must, at the defendant's request, be closed to all, except lawyers, witnesses,
and court attaches. The California appellate courts have ruled that the trial court has no
discretion to deny a defendant's request to close hearings to the public. E.g., People v. Elliot,
54 Cal. 2d 498, 354 P.2d 225 (1960). But see, People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d
16 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 994 (1964).
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The reason for this recommendation is twofold: first, to prevent prejudicial
pretrial publicity that could affect the selection of an impartial jury; second, to
preserve the effect of holding certain proceedings in the absence of the jury.
At trial when the judge sends the jury out of the courtroom so he can hear
arguments by counsel on questions of evidence and he thereafter rules the evi-
dence inadmissible on account of prejudice, the purpose of the proceeding is
negated if the inadmissible evidence is emblazoned in headlines or otherwise
published in the newspapers to be read by members of the jury. Experience has
shown that such published information reaches the jurors when the very ruling
was designed to keep it from them. Professor Kurland has quoted Judge Rifkind
as saying:
If you or I wrote a little memorandum, "I think witness X is a liar and
you should not believe a word he says," and if you or I handed that
memorandum on the courthouse steps to a juror, we may be sure that
whoever was trying that case would send for the bailiff to fetch us forth-
with before the court where we would be dealt with summarily. Why
should it make a difference that I have a big machine which multiplies
that memorandum into a million copies and that I have a newsboy deliver
it to the jury for me? I don't know, but apparently it does make a dif-
ference.' 9
Admonitions by the court to the jury to disregard what they have read are
fruitless.20
To prevent any collusion, our recommendations insist that a transcript of
these proceedings be made available to the public and press after the trial has
been concluded. The jurors, of course, are admonished not to read or listen to
any publicity concerning the case. However, human nature being what it is,
such admonitions are difficult to enforce.
There are two alternatives to these proposals. First, we can sequester the
jury and censor their reading matter as well as what they may see and hear on
radio and television. This, however, imposes an undue burden on the citizen
juror in long and protracted cases, and the cost to the taxpayers is extremely
high. The other alternative is to hold the hearing in open court, admonishing
the press to refrain from publishing any accounts of proceedings from which
the jury has been excluded ;21 but as Clifton Daniel has stated:
We will not yield up the privilege of publishing anything said in open
court. If judges feel that such things may be prejudicial, they must use
19 Hearings on Fair Trial and Free Press Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
and the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 334 (1965).
20 Several important convictions have been reversed by the Supreme Court where such
prejudicial evidence was ruled inadmissible, only to be published and read by the jurors in
the newspapers. E.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Accord, Watson v.
State 413 P.2d 22 (Alaska 1966).
21 This alternative has one fatal weakness. Assume a hearing were held in open court
from which the jury had been excluded, and a reporter for some particular newspaper was not
present when the ruling or admonition was given. Learning of the facts, and because he
was not present, such reporter would not feel bound by the admonition and thus could dis-
seminate the prejudicial information in his newspaper, or by means of radio or television.
Experience has shown that once this happens the other newspapers, whose representatives
were present, follow up and print the prejudicial information to prevent a complete "scoop."
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the remedies already available to them. They can clear the courtroom;
they can call counsel to the bench or to their chambers .... But they can-
not edit our newspapers.22
We have followed Mr. Daniel's suggestion. While we realize he does not
speak for the entire communications media of this country, we nevertheless
believe that he expressed the point of view of a responsible segment of that
profession.
Finally, we have recommended the use of the contempt power in a very
limited area, proposing that as a part of the punishment, the offender be required
to pay only the defendant's costs." In my opinion, before anyone could be
found in contempt of court under this proposal, the published statement would
have to present "a clear and present danger '" 4 to the administration of justice
under the previous rulings of the United States Supreme Court25 or one would
have to violate a valid court order. This is the law today. The only thing new
is the nature of the fine recommended. However, before the fine can be levied,
the court, in addition to determining that contempt had in fact been committed,
would have to grant a mistrial, provide a change of venue, or otherwise set aside
the conviction.
While recognizing that the word "contempt" is anathema to the news
media, the Committee believed that the responsible, reasonable members of
their profession would not quarrel too strongly with reasonable measures to
punish the irresponsible among them. In general, this is the underlying philos-
ophy of our tentative proposals.
Just as a reporter is under the lash to obtain a story when ordered to by
his city editor, so our ,Committee was under the lash of the remarks in the
Warren Commission's Report and, more potently, the direct suggestions of the
Supreme Court expressed in the Sheppard case. 8 The Court observed:
The carnival atmosphere at trial could easily have been avoided since
the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control of the
court. . . Secondly, the court should have insulated the witnesses ...
Thirdly, the court should have made some effort to control the release of
leads, information and gossip to the press by police officers, witnesses, and the
counsel for both sides. . . .Defense counsel immediately brought to the
court's attention the tremendous amount of publicity in the Cleveland
Press that "misrepresented entirely the testimony" in the case. Under such
circumstances, the judge should have at least warned the newspapers to
check the accuracy of their accounts. And it is obvious that the judge
should have further sought to alleviate this problem by imposing control
over the statements made to the news media by counsel, witnesses, and
especially the Coroner and the public officers. The prosecution repeatedly
made evidence available to the news media which was never offered in the
trial. Much of the "evidence" disseminated in this fashion was clearly inad-
22 Daniel, Pre-trial Publicity, Nieman Reports, Sept. 1965, pp. 2, 19.
23 There were those on our committee who urged a stronger penalty -the assessment
of all court costs -however, the majority prevailed in favoring this more moderate approach.
24 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Holmes, J.).
25 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
26 384- U.S. 333 (1966).
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missible. The exclusion of such evidence in court is rendered meaningless
when news media make it available to the public. For example, the pub-
licity about Sheppard's refusal to take a lie detector test came directly
from police officers and the Coroner. The story that Sheppard had been
called a "Jekyll-Hyde" personality by his wife was attributed to a prosecu-
tion witness. No such testimony was given. The further report that there
was "a 'bombshell witness' on tap" who would testify as to Sheppard's
"fiery temper" could only have emanated from the prosecution. More-
over, the newspapers described in detail clues that had been found by the
police, but not put into the record."
Our recommendations have followed the guidelines recommended by this deci-
sion of the highest court in the land.
While the members of our Committee do not expect complete agreement
with all our views, we still hope that the news media and the public will be
tolerant of our position and sympathetic to our endeavor to prevent the develop-
ment of frictions between the legal profession and the press.2" We have sought
to insure that every defendant be given the fair and impartial trial guaranteed
him under the Constitution, so that, if fairly convicted, we may avoid the expense
and burdens of appeals and retrials resulting from the legal profession's partici-
pation in the dissemination of prejudicial publicity.
It is our hope that two ancient and honorable professions, the law and
the press, working together to strike true the balance between the first and sixth
amendments, become a powerful force for the public good.
27 Id. at 358-61.
28 As was stated by the Florida Supreme Court:
There is little justification for a running fight between the courts and the
press on this question of a fair trial and a free press. Both are basic and sacred
concepts in our system of government. Both are in one Constitution and govern
one nation of millions of individuals. All that is required to preserve both is for
the press and the courts to place the emphasis on the Constitution instead of them-
selves. Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d 33, 38 (Fla. 1958).
APPENDIX [ed.]
In late April, subsequent to the Law School's symposium, the ABA Advisory
Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press met with representatives of the news
media and agreed upon certain modifications of its original recommendations.
These revisions were aptly summarized in a recent issue of the American Bar News;
they would:
Modify the proposed strengthened canon of ethics banning prejudicial public state-
ments by attorneys to provide that restrictions would apply until the imposition of sentence
in the trial court, but not throughout the time the case may be pending in appellate courts.
Allow police departments and other law enforcement agencies a "reasonable time" to
adopt their own internal rules governing release of crime news during the critical pre-
trial and trial period. If they failed to do so, steps could be taken to implement the recom-
mendations by rule of court, or by legislation.
Narrow the proposals with respect to use of the contempt power, and eliminate an
earlier recommendation that proceeds of a contempt fine could be assigned by the court to
reimburse a defendant in a criminal case for added costs incurred by him as a result of the
contempt. Am. B. News, May, 1967, at 17.
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